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BLURRING THE LINES OF ENVIROMENTAL 
RESPONSIBILITY:  
HOW CORPORATE AND PUBLIC GOVERNANCE WAS 
CIRCUMVENTED IN THE OK TEDI MINING LIMITED 
DISASTER  
 
JUDITH MARYCHURCH∗ & NATALIE STOIANOFF∗∗ 
 
This paper will present the preliminary findings of a research project into the impact 
of legislative legitimation of environmental damage on corporate governance in 
multinational companies and on public governance in the nation state.  The 
environmental devastation of the Ok Tedi mine in Papua New Guinea (PNG) will be 
the focus of the paper. 
 
The responsibility for pollution resulting from mining, according to the OECD’s 
Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) rests with the owners of the mining entity. This 
principle relies on a number of legislative instruments and often a mix of command 
and control mechanisms are advocated. The case of the Ok Tedi mine in PNG has 
demonstrated that this mix raises conflicts and paradoxes for the shareholders and the 
regulator. BHP Billiton and the PNG Government have utilized the long-standing 
legal principles pertaining to the separate legal entity status of a company to separate 
ownership and responsibility for on-going environmental damage. A series of specific 
legislative instruments, in addition to these long-standing legal principles, were used 
to establish the mine, permit on-going damage and allow the mine to continue.   
 
This paper will focus on the legal aspects of the transfer of responsibility for the 
environmental disaster, including a comprehensive history of the Ok Tedi Mine as 
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protected by legislative and other government action.  This chronology of 
governmental action, taken with the actions of BHP at the equivalent time, will give 
rise to issues related to corporate governance and accountability to shareholders, as 
well as issues of public governance and responsibility to the welfare of the citizenry.  
In an era of enhanced focus on corporate governance, this analysis is pertinent to an 
understanding of how the principles of responsible corporate governance may be 
circumvented by legislative action. 
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I  INTRODUCTION 
 
Few would argue that those who cause environmental damage should be responsible 
for it, either through restoration of the environment as near as possible to its original 
state, or compensating those detrimentally affected by the damage done where it 
cannot be rectified.  Difficulties arise, however, where the impact of the damage will 
be felt well beyond the current generation, and to two or more generations into the 
future.  This is the case with the Ok Tedi mine in Papua New Guinea (PNG).  In the 
corporate setting, there is the issue of precisely identifying the polluter: is it the 
corporation conducting the operation?  What, if any, liability can be ascribed to the 
shareholders of the mining company?  The separate legal entity doctrine, applied 
strictly, would lay sole responsibility on the mining company, and protect the 
shareholders, and directors or managers from liability.  However, this fundamental 
principle is complicated today by the concepts of corporate governance, corporate 
social responsibility, and, specifically in the case of the Ok Tedi mine, by change in 
the identity of the corporate shareholders as liability for the environmental damage 
has been negotiated and transferred.  The issues at stake take on a higher degree of 
pertinence when one of the shareholders is the government of a nation state.  Public 
governance and responsibility to the citizenry of the nation and the communities of 
the areas most affected by the environmental damage comes to the fore. 
 
According to the OECD’s polluter pays principle,1 responsibility for mining pollution 
rests with the mining entity, the polluter.  In corporate terms, the payment by the 
polluting company ultimately affects the consumers of the ore, where the cost of 
pollution is passed on to the consumer, otherwise the cost is borne by the 
shareholders, through the reduction of profits from which dividends may be paid.  It 
has been noted that parties who pollute may in fact receive a reward through tax 
expenditure.2 In the case of the Ok Tedi mine, the polluter pays principle relies on a 
                                                 
1 See OECD, Environmentally related taxes in OECD Countries Issues and Strategies, OECD 
Publications Service, Paris 2001, 9. 
2 Natalie Stoianoff, Mary Kaidonis and Lindel House, ‘Do Tax Concessions for Mining Site 
Rehabilitation Work? Evaluating 10 Years of Reform’ in Alberto Cavaliere et al (eds) Critical Issues 
in Environmental Taxation (2006) 513. 
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number of legislative instruments, including a series of nine statutory agreements 
specific to the Ok Tedi mine.3  Both command and control mechanisms are advocated 
to achieve enforcement of the polluter pays principle.  As has been demonstrated,4 the 
case of the Ok Tedi mine raises conflicts and paradoxes for shareholders and 
regulators as a result of the mix of these command and control mechanisms.  The 
Australian company, BHP Billiton, and the PNG Government used ‘[t]he discourse of 
‘future economic benefits’ whilst responsibility and liabilities were shifted between 
them’.5  The mechanisms used to facilitate these shifts included fundamental legal 
principles permitting the separation of ownership and responsibility within a 
corporation, and the transfer of share ownership.6  The PNG government also passed a 
series of specific legislative instruments initially to establish the mine, and then to 
facilitate environmental damage, and, ultimately, to allow the mine to continue to the 
present.7   
 
This article will present the initial findings of a longer-term project considering the 
impact of legislative intervention on the legitimation of environmental damage in 
relation to corporate governance in multinational companies. The role of the 
legislature of a nation state in facilitating such legislative action will come under a 
spotlight.  A comprehensive history of the mine will be presented in order to set the 
scene for this discussion.  This will be followed by an analysis of governmental action 
taken alongside the actions of the Broken Hill Proprietary Company (BHP) at the 
equivalent time.  This analysis will give rise to issues of corporate governance, 
specifically corporate responsibility and accountability to stakeholders, as well as to 
issues of public governance and the responsibility for the welfare of the citizenry.  By 
                                                 
3 Relevant legislative instruments will be identified throughout the paper. 
4 Mary Kaidonis and Natalie Stoianoff, ‘The Polluter Pays Principle and Rehabilitation of Mining Sites: 
Facing Responsibilities or transferring the cost?’ (Paper presented at the Fourth Annual Global 
Conference on Environmental Taxation Issues, Experience and Potential, Sydney, 5-7 June 2003). 
5 Mary Kaidonis and Natalie Stoianoff, ‘Corporate and State Mining Legitimated: Transferring Future 
Economic Benefits or “Passing the Buck”?’ (Paper presented at the School of Accounting and 
Finance Seminar Series, Victoria University, Melbourne, 2004) 2. 
6 Ibid 9. See also Mary Kaidonis and Natalie Stoianoff, ‘Regulator or Shareholder of a Mining 
Company: Transferring Financial Economic Benefits or Passing the Buck?’ (Paper presented at the 




Australasian Law Teachers Association - ALTA 
2006 Refereed Conference Papers 
 
  7
identifying the legal mechanisms of the transfer of responsibility for the 
environmental disaster, this article will also demonstrate how the principles of 
responsible corporate governance may be circumvented by legislative action. 
 
II CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND 
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Corporate governance at its essence ‘refers to control of corporations and to systems 
of accountability by those in control’.8  In terms of accountability, we must identify 
the stakeholders to whom those in control are accountable.   While accountable to the 
company as a whole, that is the shareholders as a body, the case of a mining company 
so clearly affecting the environment and the way of life of the local population, raises 
the issue of accountability to the current, and future, population of the region.  What 
does the concept of corporate social responsibility require in these circumstances?  
Closure of the mine, or would continuation be acceptable in some circumstances?   
 
For the present, the decision has been made to continue the mine.  So the question of 
what is required by corporate social responsibility in this situation is a very real one.  
An understanding of the requirements in relation to corporate responsibility, the term 
ultimately adopted by the Commonwealth Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services but essentially interchangeable with corporate 
social responsibility, can be gleaned from this body’s (hereafter the ‘Committee’) 
recent report, titled Corporate Responsibility: Managing Risk and Creating Value.9  
Within this report, corporate responsibility is recognized as a subset of corporate 
governance, the Committee pointing out that: 
  
The terms corporate responsibility and corporate governance are sometimes confused 
with each other.  Corporate governance refers to broader issues of company 
                                                 
8 John Farrar, Corporate Governance Theories, Principles and Practice (2nd ed, 2005) 3. 
9 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Parliament of Australia, 
Corporate Responsibility: Managing Risk and Creating Value (2006) 
 <http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/Committee/corporations_ctte/corporate_responsibility/report/index.h
tm> at 2 April 2007, specifically 4-5 on the discussion of the terms ‘corporate responsibility’ and 
‘corporate social responsibility’. 
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management practices.  It concerns the conduct of the board of directors and the 
relationships between the board, management and shareholders.  At the core of 
corporate governance is the transparency of major corporate decisions, and 
accountability to shareholders. 
 
Corporate responsibility is only an aspect of an organisation’s governance and risk 
management processes.10 
 
So what is corporate responsibility?  The Committee makes no attempt to come to a 
specific conclusion, instead it recognizes that the concept is ‘multi-faceted’ and 
‘[b]ecause of the sheer diversity of modern corporations … can have a range of 
different meaning to different people and different organisations’.11  However, it is 
 
…usually described in terms of a company considering, managing and balancing the 
economic, social and environmental impact of its activities.  It is about companies 
assessing and managing risks, pursuing opportunities and creating corporate value, in 
areas beyond what would traditionally be regarded as a company’s core business.  It is 
also about companies taking an ‘enlightened self-interest’ approach to considering the 
legitimate interests of a company’s stakeholders.12 
 
Taking into account these factors, it would be fair to say that a company engaged in 
mining, for example, should be taking into account, in decision-making by the board 
of directors, interests beyond legitimate risk-taking ventures aimed at increasing profit 
for the company’s shareholders.  However, a range of views on the duties of directors 
complicates this.  Pointing to the prominent case concerning James Hardie Industries, 
the Committee considered the view at one end of the spectrum ‘that a director would 
be failing in his or her duties if consideration was given to any factors other than 
maximizing profit’.13 This reflects the ‘directors’ restrictive interpretation’ where 
‘directors claim that they are unable to undertake activities based on corporate 
responsibility, because such activities may not be directly “in the best interests of the 
                                                 
10 Ibid 6–7. 
11 Ibid 5. 
12 Ibid 4. 
13 Ibid xiii–xiv. 
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corporation”’.14  There is also the shareholders restrictive interpretation that reaches a 
similar position via a different route.15 This ‘view is that money invested in or 
generated by a company is in fact the property of shareholders’.16  As a result, the 
company has no right to expend the company’s money on philanthropic initiatives, 
but ‘should distribute its funds to shareholders and allow them to choose whether to 
reinvest the money, use it for consumption, or apply it to philanthropic causes’.17 
 
Further along the spectrum is the classification of ‘short term interests interpretation’, 
which recognizes that exercise of corporate responsibility may be appropriate if ‘it 
can be justified on the basis of annual return on investment’.18  Finally, there is the 
enlightened self-interest interpretation’, such that ‘careful and appropriate corporate 
responsibility is almost always in the interests of the corporation, and thus falls well 
within the behaviour permitted to directors under current duties’.19 This final 
interpretation is most consistent with the description of the term ‘corporate 
responsibility’ referred to above.  As a result, the ‘stakeholders’ to whose interests the 
company should have regard, must be identified. 
 
Simply put, ‘stakeholders’ ‘include company shareholders, but also include some non-
shareholder interests groups [such as] … employees, the community and the 
environment’.20  In its submission to the Committee, the Business Council of 
Australia pointed out that ‘[w]hile some stakeholders, such as employees, will be 
common to all corporations, many others will vary significantly. A mining company 
for example is likely to place a higher priority on environmental issues than an 
accounting firm’.21  In the context of the Ok Tedi mine, stakeholders clearly extend to 
local indigenous communities and to the environment on which they depend, 
particularly when one considers that basic tort law and the action for nuisance by 
                                                 
14 Ibid 46. 
15 Ibid 49. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid 46. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid 5. 
21 Ibid 6. 
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neighbours to the mine can give rise to significant liability that the directors of the 
mining company must take into consideration.22 
 
III HISTORY OF THE OK TEDI MINE AND ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE TO THE FLY 
RIVER SYSTEM 
 
The Ok Tedi mine in Papua New Guinea (PNG) has had a vexed history, illustrated 
by the substantial media coverage over, particularly during the late 1980s and early 
1990s, concerning the pollution caused by the dumping of tailings into the Fly River.  
While the first general compensation payments were made in 1996, mining and the 
dumping of tailings has continued to the present, facilitated by legislation passed by 
the PNG parliament and the transfer of ownership of the mine from BHP to PNG 
Sustainable Development Program Ltd. 
 
The history of the Ok Tedi Mine dates back to 1963, when a government patrol 
making contact with the Min people of the Star Mountains identified signs of copper 
mineralisation and collected samples for analysis.23  Five years later, the Mt Fubilan 
copper-gold deposit was discovered.24  The Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited 
(BHP) began negotiations with the PNG government in 1976, with the government 
passing the Mining (Ok Tedi Agreement) Act 1976 (PNG).25  Development of the 
mining project did not begin until 1981, following a ten volume feasibility study 
produced in 1979 for consideration by the PNG government, and the formation of Ok 
Tedi Mining Ltd (OTML) also in 1981.26  Development itself took eight years and 
US$1 400 million.27   The area in which the mine is situated is remote, and prior to the 
establishment of the mine, difficult to access.28  In addition, the terrain was unstable, 
                                                 
22 See cases such as St Helens Smelting Co v Tipping (1865) 11 HLC 642; Halsey v Esso Petroleum 
[1961] 2 All ER 145; L’Estrange v Brisbane Gas Co [1928] St R Qd 180. 






28 Roger Higgins, Ok Tedi: Creating Community Partnerships for Sustainable Development (2002), 
<http://www.oktedi.com/reports/news/26/CIM_paper_Higgins.pdf > at 2 April 2007, 2.  
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resulting in the destruction of foundations of the Ok Ma tailing dam by landslides in 
1984, with the effect that tailings were no longer able to be stored.29  It was at this 
point that the environmental challenges of tailings disposal became most apparent.  
With the original tailings storage facility in the adjacent valley no longer able to be 
used and the waste disposal site abandoned, alternative methods of tailings disposal 
had to be found, with riverine disposal selected as the best method.30  It is interesting 
that tailings ‘storage’ so easily translated into ‘disposal’.31  Riverine disposal of 
tailings began soon after the commencement of operations at the mine,32 
approximately May 1984, with the commencement of gold production, and copper 
production following in 1987.33  By this time, the Sixth Supplemental Agreement had 
been enacted, and environmental studies carried out to begin looking at the effect of 
sediment caused by the tailings on the Fly River.34  It was the same year that BHP 
agreed to provide management services to OTML.35  In 1989, following cessation of 
gold mining and the mine becoming a sole copper mine, the PNG government set a 
maximum sediment level for the Fly River, with OTML required to monitor sediment 
effects.36   
 
The dieback phenomenon resulting from the dumping of tailings was first noted in 
1991,37 the same year that OTML first paid a preference dividend.38  While initially 
evident in very limited areas, this effect had spread to 1,300 square kilometers by 
2002, and was estimated at that time to potentially affect 2 040 square kilometers.39  
In 2005, the dieback area affected 1 588 square kilometers, and was estimated to  
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. This occurs even within one sentence: ‘An interim tailings storage facility was built close to the 
mine to allow gold production to begin while alternative tailings disposal was investigated.’ 
32 Ibid. 
33 See Ok Tedi Mining Limited , above n 23. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid.   
36 Ibid. 
37 See Higgins, above n 28, 2. 
38 See Ok Tedi Mining Limited, above n 23. 
39 Higgins, above n 28, 2. 
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ultimately affect 2 500 square kilometers.40 The mine waste has caused a sedimentary 
build-up that has caused extensive flooding over previously productive land used for 
subsistence farming, rendering the land useless for traditional pursuits, and resulting 
in more difficult travel and reductions in fish populations,41 further impacting on the 
local inhabitants ability to support themselves.  There are conflicting reports on the 
impact of the waste on the water itself and the food caught or grown in the affected 
areas.  OTML representatives have stated that the water is not poisoned by mine 
waste.42  However, OTML has recently reported evidence of acid rock drainage along 
levy banks of the Fly River in the form of sulphides.43  While OTML has specifically 
addressed this in its Annual Review of 2005, the problem is not likely to be easily 
addressed, and the leeching of sulphides and dissolved metals is likely to continue 
after closure of the mine.  Concern has been expressed that the impact of mining will 
be felt sixty years beyond closure of the mine.44  Realistically, one wonders if the 
effect may well last beyond this time frame given the nature and extent of the damage.   
 
IV THE IMPORTANCE OF OK TEDI TO PNG 
 
In order to understand the complicated history of the mine, and the complex issues 
surrounding its operation and continuation into the future, it is necessary to appreciate 
some of the key statistics pertaining to the Ok Tedi Mine.  According to Keith 
Faulkner, Managing Director of OTML, Ok Tedi contributes approximately 25 per 
cent of export earnings, 15 per cent of GDP, and 20 per cent of tax receipts.45  In 
2002, it was PNG’s largest corporate employer, with, according to Roger J. Higgins, 
Managing Director of OTML at the time, over 90 per cent of the company’s staff 
                                                 
40 Ok Tedi Mining Limited, 2005 Annual Review (2005), 15 




43 Ibid 5. 
44 NGO Environmental Watch Group, PNG, BHP’s Ok Tedi Mine: What Future? (2000) 
<http://users.nlc.net.au/mpi/oktedi/intropl.html> at 20 November 2005. 
45 Keith Faulkner, ‘The Ok Tedi Dilemma’ (Speech delivered at the 2005 Mine Closure Planning 
Workshop, Tabubil Golf Club, PNG, Friday 28 October 2005), 4. 
<http://www.oktedi.com/reports/reports/134/OkTediManagingDirectorSpeechOct2005.pdf> at 2 
April 2007. 
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being PNG citizens.46  This is current to 2005, with OTML reporting that 96 per cent 
of its employees are PNG citizens, and 47 per cent of these from the Western 
Province, in which Ok Tedi is located.47  In light of these figures, it is little wonder 
that the PNG government wants the mine to continue: without the mine, governmental 
services would be severely affected. However, this must be weighed against the future 
cost of reclaiming the land around the mine, and supporting citizens unable to sustain 
themselves, either through traditional subsistence farming or due to illness.  Hence, 
the contribution of the Ok Tedi mine to the PNG economy may ultimately be in the 
negative.   
 
There appear to be two opposing groups of PNG citizens in relation to the mine and 
its continuation: one officially supporting continuation of the mine as a means to 
ensure current employment, income and sustainability of supporting businesses and 
services;48 and another voicing dissension.49  The latter group is periodically heard, 
though has significantly less presence, understandably, than the voices heard through 
OTML and its supporters. The concerning thing is the suggestions of possible 
misrepresentation50 or potentially even intimidation, in relation to the ‘agreement’ of 
the local population to the continuation of the mine.51 Kisch has conducted a study 
into process of obtaining the Community Mine Continuation Agreements (CMCAs) 
that were an integral part of the withdrawal of BHP from OTML,52 and whether or not 
‘OTML, in its drafting of the environmental predictions for the Community Mine 
Continuation Agreements, abided by traditional standards of informed consent.’53  
Kisch hypothesized that the communities who signed CMCAs ‘did not fully 
                                                 
46 Higgins, above n 28, 1.  
47 David Masani, General Manager, Community and Business Support, OTML, Ok Tedi Mining 
Limited (2006) <http://www.wanbelistap.com/Downloads/WG1_BusinessOverview.pdf> at 2 April 
2007.  
48 See OTML’s website <http://www.oktedi.com/aboutus> at 2 April 2007. 
49 See, eg, NGO Environmental Watch Group, above n 44. 
50 Geza Theodore Kisch, Environment versus Development: Assessing Environmental Predictions and 
Economic Goals in the Community Mine Continuation Agreements for Western Province, Papua 
New Guinea (2006), 10–14: pointing to evidence of areas of the CMCAs that appear to 
underestimate or misstate the likely impact 
<http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~es196/projects/2006final/kisch.pdf> at 2 April 2007. 
51 See, eg, statements made by local indigenous people, on the basis of anonymity due to fear for safety 
<http://www.mpi.org.au/campaigns/waste/kiunga_summit> at 2 April 2007. 
52 Kisch, above n 50. The CMCAs will be discussed further below. 
53 Ibid 7. 
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understand the implications of the CMCA, and that their motivations to sign the 
agreement were based largely on misinformation’.54  While ultimately suggesting 
further investigation and study, Kisch identifies sufficient evidence to call into 
question the legal validity of the CMCAs as binding contracts with the communities 
that signed them, and to query the integrity of the CMCA process that was critical to 
BHP withdrawal.  This would suggest that the exercise of corporate responsibility of 
BHP and OTML has been severely lacking in relation to the local population and 
environment in the Fly region of PNG. 
 
V  TRACING GOVERNMENTAL ACTION IN RESPONSE TO ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 
 
The role of the PNG government in Ok Tedi dates from the beginning of the mine to 
the present.  The government has passed several legislative instruments specific to the 
Ok Tedi mine, that have assisted OTML in continuing the mine, and in fact has a 
share in OTML.  Ownership of OTML has changed over time, most notably with the 
exit of BHP Billiton in 2002.  The company was originally wholly owned by the 
Independent State of PNG, and the Mining (Ok Tedi Agreement) Act  1976 (PNG) 
permitted Dampier Mining Co Ltd (‘Damco’), a wholly-owned subsidiary of BHP, to 
take over the company, with the State to retain up to a 20 per cent shareholding, with 
rights to elect directors.  The supplemental agreement acts passed by the PNG 
parliament reveal the changing ownership structure over time, with change occurring 
frequently over the period 1980 to 1986 inclusive.  In addition, these instruments also 
reveal mechanisms implemented to affect the responsibility for environmental damage 
to the area surrounding the mine. 
Mining (Ok Tedi Agreement) Act 1976 
PNG 
Original agreement representing outcome 
of negotiations between PNG government 
and BHP via wholly-owned subsidiary 
Dampier Mining Co Ltd or ‘Damco’, to 
share in Ok Tedi Development Company 
Pty Limited.55 
 
                                                 
54 Ibid 8. 
55 Sole beneficial ownership of the Ok Tedi Development Company Pty Limited was to remain with the 
State during the investigations and studies stage, with Damco subsequently having the opportunity to 
acquire the company.  
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Mining (Ok Tedi Supplemental 
Agreement) Act 1980 PNG 
Agreement to amend ownership of 
Damco’s share to a consortium of Damco, 




Mining (Ok Tedi Second Supplemental 
Agreement) Act 1981 PNG 
Damco assigns rights to BHP Minerals 
Holdings Proprietary Limited and Mt 
Fubilan Development to Amoco Minerals 
Company.  Ok Tedi Mining Limited formed 
to operate the mine. 
 
Mining (Ok Tedi Third Supplemental 
Agreement) Act 1983 PNG 
An agreement to resolve the issue of 
environmental liability between them in 
respect of any environmental damage that 
may be caused to the Fly River and its 
environs in the territory of the Republic of 
Indonesia. 
 
Mining (Ok Tedi Fourth Supplemental 
Agreement) Act 1985 PNG 
Addresses financing issues, including loans 
and responsibility for the obligations 
thereunder. 
 
Mining (Ok Tedi Fifth Supplemental 
Agreement) Act 1985 PNG 
Requires the State to acquire 20 per cent of 
the shares in OTML and to contribute to 
financing. 
 
Mining (Ok Tedi Sixth Supplemental 
Agreement) Act 1986 PNG 
Amendments made to the original 
agreement to recognize an increase in the 
expected output of the mine, and to 
implement favourable taxation and other 
cost arrangements for OTML. 
 
Mining (Ok Tedi Seventh Supplemental 
Agreement) Act 1986 PNG 
Further amendments to financial 
arrangements. 
 
Mining (Ok Tedi Restated Eighth 
Supplemental Agreement) Act 1995 
PNG 
An act to, essentially, allow the mine to 
continue and to compensate those 
detrimentally affected by its operations. 
 
Mining (Ok Tedi Ninth Supplemental 
Agreement) Act 2001 PNG 
An act to allow BHP to exit OTML via 
transfer of its shareholding to the newly 
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Apart from the third supplemental agreement, these acts are lengthy and extensive.  
Further study is necessary to ascertain precisely the mechanisms utilised to address 
environmental issues, the transfer of share ownership and management 
responsibilities, compensation for PNG citizens affected by the dumping of tailings 
and the issue of mine continuation and ultimate closure.  Some observations that can 
be raised based on other sources of information, particularly concerning the exit of 
BHP from OTML, include potential constitutional issues surrounding the Mining (Ok 
Tedi Ninth Supplemental Agreement) Act 2001 PNG.  This Act was the subject of 
constitutional challenge by the then Opposition leader of PNG, but was subsequently 
dropped.56  Negotiations surrounding BHP’s exit from the mine were under way, with 
the approval of the National Executive Council of PNG, by February 2001.57  
Documentation issued by OTML shortly thereafter demonstrates an awareness of the 
need to consult with, inform and work with local communities affected by the mine, 
and to put in place structures to assist the community in developing long-term 
initiatives in regard to food security and infrastructure.58  This was given more formal 
effect in the Mine Continuation Agreement process, which ultimately translated into 
mine continuation agreements with all of the communities affected by the mine.  
These agreements purported to ‘release[d] Ok Tedi and its shareholders from all 
demands and claims associated with future environmental impacts’.59  At the same 
time, OTML and BHP were defending legal actions in the Victorian Supreme Court in 
respect of alleged breaches of the 1996 agreements to compensate local communities 
                                                 
56 Renate Foster Mas, ‘Unless Court Intervenes, BHP Exits Ok Tedi Dec. 31’, American Metal Market 
(United States), 14 December 2001 
<http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3MKT/is_242_109/ai_81018260> at 2 April 2007; 
Former PNG Prime Minister Michael Somare submitted the constitutional challenge: Danielle 
Knight, ‘BHP Billiton Leaves the Scene of the Crime’, Asia Times Online (Hong Kong), 5 January 
2002 <http://www.atimes.com/oceania/DA05Ah01.html> at 2 April 2007.  A further constitutional 
challenge was made by former South Fly PNG MP Gabia Gagarimabu in the PNG Supreme Court: 
OTML,‘Class Action Proceedings Against Ok Tedi Dismissed’ (Press Release, 16 January 2004) 
 <http://www.oktedi.com/reports/news/34/OkTediMedia_Release16_1_04.pdf?PHPSESSID=919475
bd948193837d54d66cd0f8259f> at 2 April 2007. 
57 Office of the Prime Minister, PNG, ‘NEC Endorses Ok Tedi Talks’ (Press Release, Tuesday 20 
February 2001) 
<http://www.oktedi.com/reports/news/9/NEWS_NEC_endorseOkTeditalks.pdf?PHPSESSID=48dce
e1201eb5bb489bdb47c58ca0c3b> at 2 April 2007. 
58 OTML, ‘Update on Ok Tedi’ (Press Release, 10 March 2001) 
 <http://www.oktedi.com/reports/news/8/NEWS_Update_10_3_2001.pdf?PHPSESSID=987e1b8369
13865b90aaf0020d78a998> at 2 April 2007. 
59 Mas, above n 56, 2. 
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for the damage done by the dumping of tailings.60  As noted above, Kisch has raised 
substantial questions about the nature of the process by which signing of the CMCAs 
were obtained, and the possible misinformation provided to local communities 
presented with OTML and BHP representatives carrying CMCA documents for 
signing.61  The ‘pro-forma’ CMCAs62 left compensation the only variable in the 
agreement on which local communities could negotiate.63 Kisch has stated that 
‘[s]ince the environmental damage was a pressing issue for these communities, this 
non-negotiable aspect presented two choices: sign and receive compensation, or not 
sign, and receive no compensation, and still suffer the environmental damage’.64  
Further more, the Mining (Ok Tedi Ninth Supplemental Agreement) Act 2001 (PNG) 
in s 6 provides that: 
 
(1) The signature or other execution of a Community Mine Continuation 
Agreement by a person representing or purporting to represent a Community 
or clan, or that person’s delegate, binds all of the members of that 
Community or clan to that Community Mine Continuation Agreement 
notwithstanding –  
(a) that there is no express authority for that person to sign or execute 
the Community Mine Continuation Agreement on behalf of the 
members of the Community or clan concerned; or 
(b) that not all representatives of the relevant community or clan have 
signed or otherwise executed the Community Mine Continuation 
agreement; or 
(c) that not all members of the Community are parties to the 
Community Mine Continuation Agreement; or  
(d) any requirement of the Underlying Law. 
 
                                                 
60 Ibid. 
61 Kisch, above n 50, 13-15. 
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(2) The acts and deeds of a person described in Subsection 91: in respect of any 
matter referred to in the relevant Community Mine Continuation Agreement 
bind each person on behalf of whom that person purports to be acting, and 
where a person purports to be acting on behalf of the whole of that person’s 
Community or clan, that person’s acts and deeds bind each existing and 
future member of that person’s Community or clan, including, without 
limitation children and persons who are subsequently born into or 
subsequently join, that Community or clan. 
 
Clearly, this section has significant implications: a signed CMCA is prima facie valid, 
regardless of, essentially, who signs it and despite any requirement of ‘Underlying 
Law’, in perpetuity.  Furthermore, in respect of any action against BHP Billiton, s 5 of 
the Mining (Ok Tedi Ninth Supplemental Agreement) Act 2001 (PNG) may be pleaded 
‘as an absolute bar and defence to any proceedings taken by the State or a 
Government agency’.  These legislative provisions make it clear that legislation has 
been utilised to absolve BHP Billiton of responsibility for the environmental damage 
caused by the Ok Tedi mine. 
 
Beyond the actions of legitimation by the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, 
substantial questions about the role of the Fly provincial government remain 
unanswered.  Allegations of misuse of revenue generated by OTML for the Fly 
provincial government were made in 2001, to the extent of Kina (K) 185 million over  
18 years, most of which was paid in the form of royalties.65  There is evidence of 
some softening of attitude toward OTML as opposed to the provincial government, 
with a local leader, previously a plaintiff in the 1996 class action against OTML, 
describing the provincial government as ‘dead with “all the money stolen”.  It’s 
OTML that is providing services like infrastructure’.66   
 
                                                 
65 ‘Royalties Paid To Fly Government Unaccounted For’, The National (PNG), 11 April 2001, 4 
 <http://www.oktedi.com/reports/news/4/NEWS_royalties_paid_to_Govt.pdf?PHPSESSID=b9022b1
cef0626bbd9b56943d2c16406> at 2 April 2007. 
66 Ibid. 
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Filer refers to misuse of mine-related revenue by the Fly provincial government as 
having been a matter of concern since 1984.67  Combined with the very real questions 
as to whether or not the PNG government has permitted continuation of the mine for 
short and perhaps medium-term gains at the cost of the future of the Fly River 
regions, the accountability of government, both provincial and national, to the current 
and future citizens of PNG is an issue yet to be fully explored.  No doubt, the 
economic benefits of the mine between the present and 2010, perhaps 2012, have been 
taken into account.  However, the question remains as to whether or not the weight 
given to these economic benefits actually outweighs the ultimate cost of the project.  
The first company taxation paid was in 1995, ten years after production began.68 As 
noted above, there are questions over the use to which the money paid by OTML to 
the government has been put.  At this stage, the mine will close in approximately 2012 
or 2013. However, this must be balanced against the claim that the environmental 
impact of the mine will continue for three generations.69  In light of these factors, one 
wonders whether or not the economic benefits to either the Western Province or PNG 
as a whole will actually prove worthwhile, even in basic economic terms. 
 
As at April 2006, OTML was owned by PNG Sustainable Development Program Ltd 
(52 per cent); the PNG government (30 per cent) and Inmet (18 per cent).70  Under the 
Mining (Ok Tedi Ninth Supplemental Agreement) Act 2001 PNG, OTML must make 
annual payments aggregating to K175.3 million over the life of the mine to 
compensation trusts in favour of the landowners, Middle Fly, North Ok Tedi, Lower 
                                                 
67 Colin Filer, ‘Horses For Courses: Special Purpose Authorities and Local Level Governance in Papua 
New Guinea’ (Discussion Paper 2004/6, State Society and Governance in Melanesia, Research 
School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra), 10 citing F.M. Little 
and Anthony J. Regan, ‘The Use of Mineral Royalties in Western Province: A Report Prepared for 
the Fly Provincial Government’ (Institute for Applied Social and Economic Research, Boroko, 1987) 
<http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/melanesia/discussion_papers/04_06_dp_filer.pdf> at 2 April 2007; 
John Burton, ‘Mining & Maladministration in Papua New Guinea’, in Peter Larmour (ed), 
Governance & Reform in the South Pacific (Pacific Policy Paper 23, National Centre for 
Development Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, 1998) 154-82; Michael Finlayson, 
‘Sustainable Development Policy and Sustainability Planning Framework for the Mining Sector in 
Papua New Guinea’ (Working Paper 2: Benefit from Stream Analysis, PNG Department of Mining, 
Port Moresby, 2001). 
68 Ok Tedi Mining Limited, above n 23, 3. 
69 NGO Environmental Watch Group , above n 44, 2. 
70 Masani, above, n 47. 
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Ok Tedi, South Fly and Highway communities.71  In addition, the arrangements put in 
place for BHP’s exit via this agreement include the establishment of the Ok Tedi 
Development Foundation.  However, the actual role of this body is questionable.  The 
original intentions behind the foundation appear to be on sound grounds in terms of 
corporate responsibility. However, research to date does not reveal current 
involvement of the Ok Tedi Development Foundation in planning for the mine’s 
closure.  The Ok Tedi Development Foundation’s website72 does not appear to have 
been updated since its original construction in 2001.  The overview refers to the 
Foundation as to be in full operation by mid-2003, in the future tense.  No reports are 
dated later than 2001, and no links have yet been added, although they are noted as 
becoming ‘available soon’. The Foundation’s current activities are unknown, although 
there is evidence of recent activity in relation to planning for the closure of the mine.73  
In 2003, the estimated date of closure of the mine was 2010; however, this was 
increased in 2004 to 2012 as a result of a review of mine plans and reserves.74  There 
is further evidence that a re-evaluation in 2005 has seen an increase in the expected 
life of the mine to mid 2013,75 although this is not evident in OTML’s most recent 
financial report, to 31 December 2005.76   
 
PNG Sustainable Development Program Ltd (PNG SDP), a company incorporated in  
                                                 
71 As recognised in the Ok Tedi Mining Limited and its Subsidiaries Special Purpose Financial 
Statements for the Year Ended 31 December 2004 (2004), 22 
<http://www.oktedi.com/reports/news/37/OK_TEDI_MINING_LIMITED_2004_ANNUAL_REVIE
W_SUMMARY.pdf?PHPSESSID=a11d85d5701988b86a20d8366da8f8f9> at 2 April 2007. 
72 Ok Tedi Development Foundation <http://www.oktedi.com/odf/index.php> at 2 April 2007. 
73 The Keystone Centre, Working Group on the 2006 Community Mine Continuation Agreements 
(CMCA) Review, Western Province, Papua New Guinea <http://www.keystone.org/spp/env-
oktedi.html> at 2 April 2007. 
74 Ok Tedi Mining Limited, 2004 Annual Review (2004), 6 <http://www.oktedi.com/reports/news.php> 
at 2 April 2007. 
75 See <http://www.inmetmining.com/index.cfm?PID=17265&PIDList=17205,17222,17265> at 2 
April 2007. 
76 Ok Tedi Mining Limited, above n 40, 35. 
 
Australasian Law Teachers Association - ALTA 
2006 Refereed Conference Papers 
 
  21
Singapore,77 appears to have taken over the role envisaged for the Ok Tedi 
Development Foundation.  However, its direct links to OTML require independent, 
objective evaluation of statements made in relation to the provision for the future of 
the citizens of the region affected by the environmental devastation of the mine.  The 
board of directors of PNG SDP consists of seven members, three appointed by BHP 
Billiton, and three by the PNG government, and one director from Singapore.78   
 
Ultimately, this suggests that BHP Billiton has a continuing involvement in relation to 
the mine, but with an absolute coverage against any legal action in relation to it.  This 
continued involvement indicates an assumption of responsibility even though BHP 
Billiton is no longer a shareholder of OTML.  Furthermore, with three representatives 
of the PNG government, and one director from Singapore, majority voting power 
within PNG SDP appears to be in the hands of the PNG government, who has a clear 
vested interest in continuation of the mine, and another party, a former shareholder, 
which has outwardly declared an intention of extricating itself from involvement in 
the mine, but nonetheless retains a significant role in its replacement as a shareholder 
in OTML. 
 
VI SHOULDERING THE BURDEN FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DEVASTATION 
 
According to the long-standing and fundamental principle of corporate law that the 
company is responsible for its actions, OTML is clearly responsible for the pollution 
caused by the Ok Tedi mine.  However, once the mine reaches the end of its finite 
life-span, and it eventually will, despite recent extensions to estimates of its 
productive life, the rationale for OTML as an entity will cease to exist.  It is likely that 
                                                 
77 According to PNG Sustainable Development Ltd ‘[t]he main reason why BHP Billiton and the Papua 
New Guinea Government agreed on the Singapore location is that this allows the Long Term Fund to 
be invested in profitable investments anywhere in the world without attracting any taxation in 
Singapore or anywhere else. As a result, much more money will be available to support development 
in the Western Province and elsewhere in Papua New Guinea after the mine closes’: PNG 
Sustainable Development Ltd, Company Profile (2006). 
<http://www.pngsdp.com/companyprofile.html> at 2 April 2007. 
78 The PNG SDP Company Profile states that ‘[t]hese six Directors appoint one Singapore Director. 
This is Mr. Lim How Teck who was appointed after an extensive search by an international 
executive search firm’, ibid. 
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OTML will simply be wound up, with any undistributed profits passing to the 
shareholders at the time.  Assuming that the present shareholders remain the same 
over the coming years prior to closure of the mine, a likely scenario for 82 per cent of 
the shareholdings in any case, this would see funds going to PNG SDP, the PNG 
government and, currently, Inmet.  PNG SDP’s investments, according to its website, 
‘will be used to maintain a substantial development effort in Papua New Guinea for at 
least four decades after the mine closes’.79  However, the impact of the mine on the 
environment and the life of the local people is likely to continue well beyond this time 
period.  There are also questions as to which local communities are benefiting, and 
will benefit, from assistance from PNG SDP.80  Given that BHP Billiton appoints 
three directors to the PNG SDP board of directors, there is clearly a continued role for 
BHP Billiton in influencing decisions as to projects funded by PNG SDP for the 
benefit of local communities.  Could self-interest (here, the interests of BHP Billiton) 
influence the decisions made by it representatives on the PNG SDP board?  Kisch has 
suggested that ‘the disadvantaged communities who had more pressing needs and 
more environmental damage wound up receiving fewer development projects than the 
communities closer to the mine’.81  This would appear to be substantiated by 
resolutions passed at the inaugural meeting of the ‘Western Province Alliance for a 
Sustainable Future’ in November, 2005.82  Seven resolutions were passed at this 
meeting, including a resolution 
 
[t]hat BHP’s share (now contained in the PNG Sustainable Development Program 
Company) be brought back to Western province to benefit our people, and that all 
people of the Western Province have representation in the decision-making processes, 
including on the board of directors of the PNG Sustainable Development Program 
Company.83 
 
                                                 
79 Ibid. 
80 See Kisch, above n 50, 17–19. 
81 Ibid 18. 
82 Western Province Alliance for A Sustainable Future, ‘Western Province Mine Affected People 
Continue Their Struggle For Justice’ (Press Release, 30 November 2005) 
<http://www.mpi.org.au/campaigns/waste/kiunga_summit> at 2 April 2007. 
83 Ibid. 
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This alliance is made up representatives of people from the South and North Fly 
regions.  The above resolution is stated to be based on the a series of beliefs, namely, 
that 
…[t]he terms and conditions of BHP’s exit from the Ok Tedi mine were not discussed 
with us before the company left. We feel that BHP is still responsible for the 
environmental problems in our land and must take on its share of these problems. It is a 
great injustice that this company has been allowed to escape without fixing the 
problems that it created, and without cleaning the river that is the life of our people.  
 
It is a further injustice that the people of Western Province are not the main 
beneficiaries of the arrangements for BHP’s exit when we have sacrificed so much 
already, and continue to sacrifice so much, to the benefit of the PNG nation.  
 
We do not agree with the arrangements that have been made for the transfer of BHP’s 
52 per cent share to the PNG Sustainable Development Program Company. This 
company is born from our suffering.  
 
The environmental problems facing us are increasing, and are making it difficult, if not 
impossible for many people of the province to meet basic needs for food and water, or 
to pay for our children’s school fees or health needs. Once our environment provided us 
with all our needs, but this is no longer possible. 
 
With this in mind, there is an urgent need to address the structure, location and 
allocation of funds held by the PNG Sustainable Development Program Company with 
the main goal of ensuring that the people of Western Province have a primary role in 
the decision making process, and are the sole beneficiaries of BHP’s 52 per cent share 
in the mine.  
 
The money from the BHP 52 per cent share must be allocated to priorities that have 
been identified by the people of Western Province. These funds will help us to meet the 
very big challenges facing us. These problems will face us and our children and 
grandchildren. We have the right to determine our own future.84 
 
                                                 
84 Ibid. 
 
Australasian Law Teachers Association - ALTA 
2006 Refereed Conference Papers 
 
  24
Such evidence puts into question the Commonwealth Parliamentary Committee’s 
view that BHP Billiton is a leading Australian company in the area of corporate 
governance.85 However, in order to provide a full exploration of these issues, it would 
be necessary to delve more deeply into the on-going role of BHP Billiton and to 
investigate the company’s own discourse on the Ok Tedi mine disaster and its current 
role.  It appears that, in concert with the PNG government, legislation has been used 
to legitimate OTML’s, and ultimately BHP Billiton’s, liability for actions or 
omissions that have decimated the environment on which indigenous residents of the 
areas affected by the dumping of tailings from the mine have relied.  This brings into 
question the role and responsibility of the PNG government in representing its people 




The history of the ownership and management of OTML reveals extensive 
collaboration between the PNG government and the companies with shareholdings in 
OTML, particularly BHP Billiton.  This itself is not necessarily negative.  What must 
be considered are the actions of both the PNG government as a shareholder in OTML 
and a direct recipient of the benefits of the Ok Tedi mine, and the manner in which 
BHP Billiton was able to extricate itself from OTML and liability for the 
environmental damage, arguably against the requirements of corporate responsibility.   
The impact of the Ok Tedi mine at present is significant to the PNG government in 
terms of its contribution to PNG’s economy and to the government’s own budget.  
However, there is evidence of discord at the highest levels of the PNG government 
over the continuation of the mine and the withdrawal of BHP Billiton. as indicated by 
the abandoned constitutional challenge referred to above.  Evidence currently 
available suggests that the principles of responsible corporate governance have been 
over-taken by self interest of both current and past86 shareholders, ignoring the long 
term impact on the environment and the local communities.  The reality now is that, 
                                                 
85 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, above n 9, 21. 
86 Due to BHP Billiton’s entitlement to elect three board members to the board of directors of PNG 
SDP. 
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unless more significant efforts are made by the PNG government, OTML and its 
shareholders, the catastrophic effect of the Ok Tedi mine will continue and/or 
escalate.  Here, the PNG government and the corporate entities involved have the 
opportunity to set world’s best practice in relation to social responsibility.  Clearly 
further investigation is required to comprehend the complete impact of the legislative 
intervention used to defray liabilities that otherwise should have fallen on corporate 
entities in line with corporate responsibility requirements.  We are but at the 
beginning of the journey. 
 
  
